Mississippi Court of Appeals Affirms $4,691,000 Jury Verdict Against Baptist Hospital in Wrongful Death Case

On Tuesday the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed a $4.6 million Hinds County jury verdict in Miss. Baptist Health Systems v. Kelly. Here is the Court's opinion. This was the appeal of a 2009 trial that I wrote about in this 2009 post.

This was a pre-tort reform cap case. Ellen Kelly died as a result of exposure to latex during a surgery procedure at Baptist Hospital in Jackson. A form from an earlier surgery procedure indicated that Ellen was allergic to latex. The jury rendered a verdict against Baptist, but exonerated the doctor defendants.

The awarded damages were:

  • $29,604.52– funeral and medical expenses
  • $992,109– loss of household services
  • $1,415,880– lost wages
  • $2,253,065.48– pain and suffering

A big part of Baptist's appeal seemed to center on the fact that the jury exonerated the doctor-defendants, who also had a duty to take a proper history from Ellen. The Court rejected the argument finding that the doctors and nurses had a separate duty.

Baptist also complained because the trial court did not allow the jury to apportion fault to an anesthesiologist. I can't tell for sure, but Baptist may have been trying a version of the sneaky finger-pointing defense that I talked about in this post. The Court rejected this argument because there was no testimony suggesting that the anesthesiologist deviated from the standard of care.

Judge Ishee wrote the majority opinion. Judge Maxwell wrote a specially concurring opinion. Judge Carlton dissented based on her assessment that the plaintiff did not prove medical causation.

Joey Diaz, Christopher Williams and Dennis Sweet represented the plaintiff. Mike Wallace and a bunch of other lawyers from Wise Carter represented Baptist. Judge Winston Kidd was the trial judge.

Miss. Supreme Court Reverses and Renders $3.72 Million Hinds County Jury Verdict Against Trustmark in Banking Dispute

On Thursday the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and rendered a $3.72 million jury verdict in Trustmark National Bank v. Roxco Ltd. Here is the Court's opinion.

Facts:

Roxco was the general contractor on several state construction contracts. State law requires 3% of the cost of construction to be retained to ensure completion, but allows the contractor to access the retained amount by depositing other acceptable security. Based on this statute, Roxco deposited $1,055,000 in securities with Trustmark.

Roxco defaulted and the State instructed Trustmark to transfer the funds to the state treasury account. Roxco told Trustmark not to. Trustmark transferred the funds pursuant to the State's instructions.

The Lawsuit:

Roxco sued Trustmark for breach of contract and conversion in Hinds County Circuit Court. Trustmark defended on the basis that Miss. Code Ann. § 31–5–15 permitted the release of the funds.

The trial court did not grant Trustmark judgment as a matter of law based on the state statute. In February 2009 a jury found for Roxco and awarded it $3,720,000 in damages.     

Chris Shapley and Trey Jones with Brunini represented Trustmark. James Bobo and Precious Martin represented Roxco. Judge Tommie Green presided in the trial court.

The Court's decision:

A unanimous Court agreed with Trustmark that the statute allowed Trustmark to transfer the securities to the State. As a result, the Court reversed the trial court and rendered. Justice King wrote the Court's decision.

Miss. Supreme Court Reverses and Renders $7 million Lead Paint Verdict 4 Years After Reversing Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment

The 2007 Supreme Court Decision:

In June 2003, Jefferson County Circuit Court Judge Lamar Pickard granted Sherwin-Williams summary judgment in a lead paint case (Pollard v. Sherwin-Williams). The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed. But on February 15, 2007, the Miss. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for trial in a 5–4 decision.

Here is the Court's 2007 opinion. In reversing the trial court, the Court relied in part on the report of Plaintiff's expert Dr. John Rosen. Justice Randolph wrote the 2007 majority opinion. Chief Justice Smith dissented, arguing that there was no evidence of product identification. Justices Carlson, Dickinson and Easley joined the dissent.

The 2011 Supreme Court Decision:

The trial was in the Summer of 2009 and resulted in a $7 million jury verdict. Sherwin-Williams appealed. On Thursday the Mississippi Supreme Court issued an opinion reversing the verdict and rendering the case in favor of Sherwin-Williams. Here is the Court's 2011 opinion.

On appeal, Sherwin-Williams argued that Plaintiff's expert opinions on causation (including Dr. Rosen) were unreliable under a Daubert analysis. The Court agreed. 

Interesting language from the Court's opinion includes:

  • “The plaintiff's experts seemingly contradict each other and themselves.”
  • “it is difficult to determine whether Lidsky's opinion in the case is, proverbially, a chicken or an egg.”
  • “Dr. Lidsky was, essentially, leaning on Dr. Rosen's theory of causation, who was leaning on Dr. Lidsky's theory of injury, who was leaning on Dr. Rosen's theory of causation…ad infinitum.”

Justice Pierce wrote the Court's opinion. Justice Kitchens wrote an opinion concurring in result only and was joined by Justices Chandler, King and Randolph (in part). Justice Kitchens asserted that Sherwin-Williams should win because there was no proof of product identification.

Nine lawyers represented Sherwin-Williams on the appeal, including Wayne Drinkwater, Luther Munford, John Corlew and other lawyers with their firms. Plaintiff's attorneys were Porter & Malouf of Ridgeland, Michael Casano of Gulfport and Dennis Sweet of Jackson.

My Take:

In retrospect, it's easy to say that the Court should have affirmed summary judgment in 2007. Lord knows that's got to be what Judge Pickard thinks. But the reality is that the differing standards of review in summary judgment and Daubert make it possible that the Court was right both in 2007 and 2011.

This case was a plaintiff lawyer's worst nightmare and and dream case for defense lawyers. On the plaintiff side, if you are going to lose a big and expensive case like this, you want it to be early—like in 2003 when Judge Pickard granted summary judgment. That saves you a ton of time and money.

Defense lawyers benefit when the reverse happens. This case had a big trial and was at the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals a total of three times. With all the experts involved, I bet Sherwin-Williams had $3–5 million in this case.   

It was interesting that Justices Carlson and Dickinson did not join the concurrence, which seemed to be based on the same reasoning as their dissents in 2007. If they had joined the concurrence, then the concurrence would have been the majority opinion and the case would have gone down on product identification instead of Daubert.

The significance of this is that the case would have little—if any—precedent value because product i.d. was such a basic element of the case. A Daubert opinion has the potential to be more in play in future cases.

My Take on the Supreme Court's Decision Affirming $4 million Premises Liability Verdict

That sound that you just heard was the jaws dropping of lawyers all over Mississippi in reaction to the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in InTown Lessee Associates v. Howard. The Court affirmed a total verdict of $4 million to two plaintiffs were were beaten and robbed at the InTown Suites on I-55 in Northeast Jackson. 

Here are the key phrases from Justice Kitchens' unanimous opinion, which it states repeatedly:

“InTown argues for the first time on appeal……”

and

“InTown did not make a contemporaneous objection [at trial]……”

Translation: InTown had nothing to appeal because the potential appeal issues were not preserved during the trial.

For instance, InTown couldn't really attack the damages amount on appeal because at trial InTown agreed to a verdict form that did not separate economic and non-economic damages. The opinion states:

“InTown did not object to these instructions. Because it did not object to the form of the jury instruction at trial, InTown is procedurally barred from doing so on appeal.”

When I blogged about this verdict in 2009 I stated that there was no defense at trial. Even so, I am a little surprised to see this large of a verdict get affirmed on appeal. But if you think about it, this Supreme Court doesn't have much tolerance for stuff like not preserving objections.  

Judge Tommie Green was the trial judge. Jackson attorney Ashley Ogden represented the plaintiffs. Defense trial counsel were Wade Manor and Andy Clark with the Scott Sullivan law firm in Ridgeland. 

InTown's appellate counsel were Trey Jones and Joseph Sclafani with the Brunini law firm in Jackson. To be fair to those guys, they were not hired until after the trial and were playing a losing hand that had already been dealt. Ogden has a reputation of refusing to discuss settlement after trial, so it's unlikely that there was anything that the Brunini lawyers could do to save this one.

This decision will be good for the business of appellate defense lawyers. The take-away for large corporations and insurance companies is to hire your appellate lawyers before the trial and have them in the courtroom to make sure that all potential appeal issues are preserved. 

Here is Randy Wallace's take on the decision.      

Miss. Supreme Court Affirms $4 million Hinds County Premises Liability Verdict

The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed a $4 million Hinds County premises liability verdict today. Here is the opinion. This was the 2009 Ashley Ogden In Town Suites case that I discussed here.

I will post more on this decision later.

 

Miss. Supreme Court Reverses and Remands Rankin County Defense Verdict--Rules that Each Wrongful Death Beneficiary May Fully Participate in Trial

On Thursday a unanimous Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded a 2009 Rankin County defense verdict based on the trial court's refusal to allow attorneys representing different wrongful death beneficiaries to separately question witnesses during trial. Here is the Court's opinion in Dooley v. Byrd

Facts:

The case involved the death of two-year-old Jonathan Dooley, who was killed when the car driven by his mother collided with a trailer owned by the defendants. The facts of how the accident happened were disputed and not germane to the Court's opinion. (I know… “the G.D. Germans got nothing to do with it”Sheriff Buford T. Justice).

Dooley had 5 wrongful death beneficiaries. Jackson lawyers Don Evans and Jim Smith (former Chief Justice of the Miss. Supreme Court) represented 3 of the beneficiaries, including Jonathan's mother. William Fulgham represented the other two beneficiaries, including Jonathan's father.

Apparently, Jonathan's parents were separated or already divorced at the time of the accident and there was no love lost between them.

At trial, the two sets of lawyers had different theories and strategies. Rankin County Circuit Judge Samac Richardson (now retired) allowed each set of attorneys to give opening statements. The opinion states:

However, peace was short-lived when, in the second day of trial, Dewey requested the court's permission to question Byrd after Leah had completed her examination of him. 

The trial court refused, instructing plaintiffs' counsel to work together in presenting their case.

Supreme Court's Decision:

The Court agreed that plaintiffs' counsel should have been allowed to separately question witnesses. The Court also determined that there was reversible error in the jury instructions. As a result, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.

Chief Justice Waller wrote the Court's opinion. Justices Kitchens and King did not participate.

My Take:

It will be interesting to see if there are any repercussions from this opinion in other cases. For instance, will some aligned wrongful death beneficiary-plaintiffs show up with different attorneys for the strategic reason of getting two bites of the apple with respect to trial participation? How big of a mess will it be when the beneficiaries have different lawyers and can't get on the same page?

Double teaming already happens on the defense side all the time in cases with multiple defendants. You see defense lawyers play "good cop, bad cop" in the name of separate defendants. However, it's been my impression that double-teaming at trial has limited benefit and probably is a waste of time.

It will be interesting to see how this decision impacts how plaintiff lawyers try wrongful death cases. In this case it seems like it caused a big mess due to the different theories.

Incidentally, if this is the right case that I am thinking of I heard that Don Evans and Jim Smith weren't getting along at trial either—even though they represented the same beneficiaries.

Miss. S. Court Reverses $2.5 Million Hinds County Jury Verdict

On Thursday the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed a $2.5 million Hinds County jury verdict against Deviney Construction Company. I reported the verdict two years ago in this post.  Here is the Court's opinion.

Facts:

The plaintiff called two Deviney employees as witnesses early during plaintiff's case in chief. Circuit Judge Tommie Green ruled that the defendants cold not reserve questioning and call the witnesses during defendant's case. Defendants had to question the witnesses then or not question them at all. Defendants could not recall the witnesses to question them about the testimony of the eight plaintiff witnesses that followed.

The Ruling:

A restrained opinion stated that: “a defendant should not be required to present his or her evidence during the plaintiff's case.” The Court ruled that this was a major error and remanded the case for a new trial.

Justice Lamar wrote the unanimous opinion.Wayne Drinkwater with Bradley Arant in Jackson represented Deviney on the appeal.  

My Take:

This was a sensible decision. The trial judge's ruling is a real head scratcher.

I feel bad for the plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel Ashley Ogden. It does not appear from the record that plaintiff's counsel asked for the trial court's ruling. Nothing like getting your verdict reversed over something you didn't ask for.

Court of Appeals Reverses $130,000 Weiner Dog Attack Verdict

In a glorious victory for wiener dogs everywhere, on Tuesday a unanimous Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed and rendered a $130,000 Clay County jury verdict for the victim of a near-miss wiener dog attack. Here is the Court's decision in Penny Pinchers v. Outlaw. I'm serious. That's the name of the case.

Facts:

Sophie was a 4 month old wiener dog.

I obtained an exclusive photo of a representative 4-month old wiener dog puppy, pictured to the right. Might as well of named her Killer.

Sophie's owner took her to work with her at Penny Pinchers. The rest is history. Outlaw—being afraid of dogs—ran for the back of the store upon entering and hearing Sophie bark. Outlaw could hear Sophie's claws on the floor and, I presume, her jaws snapping.

When Outlaw saw it was little Sophie, she laughed and resumed shopping. Large quantities of catfish and sugar were on her list. But Outlaw was soon hysterical with pain in her bum hip. An ambulance was dispatched. The lawsuit followed.

Trial:

A Clay County jury apportioned 70% of fault to Penny Pinchers and 30% to Outlaw and awarded $130,000 in damages.

The Appeal:

The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered based on the finding that there was no dangerous condition.

Judge Kenny Griffis wrote the pack's majority's opinion. Wayne Williams of Tupelo represented the defendant. Rod Richmond and Chynee Bailey represented the Plaintiff.

My Take:

This will go down in history as a landmark verdict….for wiener dogs. There are some real troublemakers in the wiener dog breed. The Court's opinion gives them a license to chase customers around stores throughout Mississippi with impunity. But in a state where most of the population is armed, this could still end badly for the wiener dogs.  

Supreme Court Revisits Court of Appeals Decision on Improper Closing Arguments, Daubert

Last year I discussed the Court of Appeals decision in Denham v. Holmes in this post. The Court of appeals reversed a Lafayette County defense verdict due to issues related to Daubert, defense counsel's closing arguments and jury instructions. On Thursday the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in this opinion. But the Court disagreed with much of the Court of Appeals opinion.

As a refresher:

The case involved a car wreck on University Avenue in Oxford. Denham was turning onto the avenue and collided with a pickup truck driven by Holmes. Both vehicles were totaled and the plaintiffs suffered injuries.

The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals that it was reversible error for the trial court to allow defense counsel to comment in closing on the plaintiff's lack of expert testimony. Plaintiff's counsel referred to the expected testimony in opening, but the trial court did not allow the expert to testify. The Court determined that the comments were proper. The Court reasoned that:

“acting at their own peril, the plaintiffs invited this comment by informing the jury during opening statement that they would provide expert testimony during trial but failing to do so.”

The Court noted:

“The reality of our advocacy system is that the purpose of a party's presentation of evidence and the comments of that party's counsel, throughout the trial, is to aid that party's case, and to 'prejudice' (be detrimental to) the other party's case.” 

The Court reasoned that just because an argument hurts the other side's case does not mean that the argument is improper. Although the Court did not mention Rule of Evidence 403, I could see this language being cited in disputes involving that rule.

The Court also disagreed with the Court of Appeals' Daubert analysis. The Court agreed that the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff's accident reconstructionist to testify about his distance and timing estimates. But the Court disagreed that the expert should have been allowed to testify about causation because the opinions were not sufficiently reliable.

  Justice Carlson wrote the majority opinion. Justice Kitchens dissented on the Daubert issues and was joined by Justices Dickinson and Randolph.

Miss. Supreme Court: Deposition Errata Sheet No Substitute for Formal Rule 26 Expert Supplementation

On Thursday a unanimous Mississippi Supreme Court reversed a $4.5 million jury verdict and ordered a new trial in Hyundai Motor America v. Applewhite

The decision involved a products liability case tried in the Circuit Court of Coahoma County. The plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of three persons killed in a car crash involving a 1993 Hyundai Excel. Plaintiffs alleged that the vehicle was not crashworthy due to design and manufacturing defects.

Hyundai's appeal focused on Daubert challenges of the plaintiffs' three expert witnesses.  The Court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the experts' testimony. Significantly, the Court rejected Hyundai's argument that computer simulations alone are not sufficient to support expert testimony. The Court stated that: “[w]e are not prepared to say that an expert must physically build a model of his alternative design in order to to demonstrate efficacy.”

But the plaintiff got into trouble over changes to testimony that one of the experts made in his deposition errata sheet. The changes were to four variables used to make the expert's calculations. The plaintiff did not precede or follow the errata sheet with a formal supplementation of the expert's opinions pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 26.  

The Court stated that: “[t]he purpose of an errata sheet is to correct scrivener's errors or provide minor clarification; it is not a means of making material, substantive changes to a witnesses's testimony.” As a result, parties may not rely on a witness's deposition errata sheet as a substitute for formal and timely supplementation.

The Court ordered a new trial due to the plaintiffs' failure to supplement their discovery responses.

Justice Kitchens' wrote the Court's opinion. Ralph Chapman and others represented the plaintiffs. Lawyers from Watkins and Eager in Jackson represented Hyundai.

My Take:

This is not a surprising decision. The Supreme Court likes to see the rules of civil procedure adhered to. Lawyers have to be careful to supplement discovery responses, including expert opinions. This was not a total loss for plaintiffs, since the Court remanded the case instead of rendering.

Miss. S. Ct. Reverses $1.15 Million Jury Verdict in Lafayette County Medical Malpractice Trial

On Thursday the Miss. Supreme Court reversed and rendered a Lafayette County jury verdict of $1,150,000 in Berry v. Patten. Here is the Court's opinion.

It was a medical malpractice case involving a death from complications of gastric-bypass surgery. It appears that the target defendant was an anesthesiologist who obtained a defense verdict at trial. The verdict was against a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist. Most of the Court's nineteen page opinion summarizes the expert testimony at trial. It's pretty dry reading.

Readers without much interest in anesthesiology can probably just skip to the first line of the Court's conclusion:

This lawsuit appears to have been aimed at Dr. Jones, the anesthesiologist, who obtained a defense verdict from the jury. In fact, the plaintiffs proposed a jury instruction that would have allowed the jury to hold Dr. Jones vicariously liable for Berry's negligence.

Reading the whole opinion, it does sound like the jury cleared the target defendant and returned a verdict against a non-target defendant.  

Plaintiff lawyers should familiarize themselves with some of the "technical" defenses raised on the appeal that the Court did not get to.

Justice Dickinson wrote the Court's unanimous opinion.

Bill Walker of Oxford represented the plaintiff. Carl Hagwood and Mary Frances Stallings-England represented the defendant who lost at trial, but won on appeal. 

Miss. S. Ct. Reverses $1.8 Million Jury Verdict in Welding Rod Case

On Thursday the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed a $1,855,000 Copiah County jury verdict in a 7–2 decision in Lincoln Electric v. McLemore. Here is the Court's opinion.

Facts:

This was a product liability failure to warn case involving a welder's claim that exposure to welding fumes resulted in a neurological disease called manganism. The appeal turned on the statute of limitations.

The case was tired before Judge Lamar Pickard in November 2008.

Here are some of the key dates:

  • September 3, 2002: doctor diagnoses plaintiff with Parkinsonism and tells him it may be related to welding
  • February 2004: plaintiff began filing lawsuits claiming neurological injuries from exposure to welding products
  • October 2005: plaintiff diagnosed with manganism, which is related to welding
  • November 14, 2005: plaintiff filed complaint against defendants, but didn't serve process
  • March 3, 2006: plaintiff filed amended complaint
  • March 14, 2006: plaintif served process on defendants

Plaintiff argued that since it was agreed that welding does not cause Parkinsons, his action arose when he learned that he had manganism in 2005. Defendants argued that plaintiff knew of his injury on September 3, 2002 when he was told that his Parkinsons may be related to welding.

Majority Opinion:

Justice Chandler wrote the majority opinion. The Court ruled that the decision was controlled by Angle v. Koppers, which I previously discussed in this post. In Angle the court ruled that an action accrues when the plaintiff learns of the injury, not the discovery of the injury and its cause.

The Court concluded that plaintiff knew that he had an injury in September 2002 when the doctor informed him that he had Parkinsonism that might be related to welding.

Dissent:

Justice Kitchens dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Graves. The dissent pointed out that the jury found that the plaintiff could not have discovered his injury until October 2005. Therefore, the case was timely filed according to the dissent.  

My take:

I'm not real enamored with the majority's opinion. Was it proper for the trial court to submit the issue of when the plaintiff discovered his injury to the jury? The majority doesn't say. I would have liked for the Court to address this question.

If it was proper to submit the issue to the jury, what is the basis for substituting the Court's opinion for the jury's on a question of fact? The majority doesn't say.

Did everyone agree that Parkinsonism is not caused by welding fumes? If so, is it fair that a cause of action accrues when a doctor incorrectly tells a plaintiff that an illness may be related an activity that would give a plaintiff a claim? That seems odd.

So a plaintiff should file an action to preserve a possible claim based on an opinion from a doctor that the plaintiff knows is wrong? Wouldn't that create Rule 11 issues?

Maybe I am missing something here.

More on the Double Quick and Rebelwood Apartments Decisions

Last week I posted about the Miss. S. Court's reversal of two jury verdicts in premises liability cases. Here are my thoughts on the decisions.

Lymas v. Double Quick

This case was famous not for the underlying verdict, but because the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the damages caps on non-economic damages. The Court reversed and rendered on liability, however, and did not mention the caps in the opinion. Justice Kitchens wrote the opinion for the unanimous majority.

Double Quick hinged on a Daubert analysis of two expert witnesses. The plaintiff had two expert witnesses on security issues, but neither opined on proximate cause other than conclusory statements in response to leading questions. Neither expert explained how the alleged failure to take steps to protect the decedent proximately caused the shooting. As a result, the Court found the testimony to be not based on sufficient facts or data and improperly speculative.

There is something to like in the decision for both plaintiffs and defendants. The Court did not change the underlying law or uphold the damages caps, which plaintiffs and their lawyers like. On the other hand, the Court did not strike the caps and gave defendants and their lawyers a lot to argue on causation issues in premises liability cases involving criminal acts by third parties.  

Rebelwood Apartments

This decision was in the news over the weekend because of the expert testimony of Jackson Deputy Police Chief Tyrone Lewis. The Clarion-Ledger reported:

JPD Deputy Police Chief Tyrone Lewis, testifying for English, said, "There is no documentation, no written statements or anybody to come forward to say that it did not happen at Rebelwood."

Cleveland Ellis III told police he accidentally killed Coleman, his friend, when his gun went off at Woodbine Terrace apartments, where he lived. He said he drove her body to Rebelwood and left her there.

That evidence was not allowed at trial, a decision by Circuit Judge Winston Kidd that the Supreme Court found erroneous.

The disputed evidence consisted of statements contained in police reports. Justice Randolph's majority opinion concluded that the trial court judge (Judge Winston Kidd) should have found the police reports to be sufficiently reliable and admitted the reports (including the statements) into evidence. In my opinion, the Court made the right ruling, but for the wrong reason.

I agree with Justice Chandler's concurrence. Judge Chandler opined that the statements in the police reports were hearsay within hearsay and therefore, should have been excluded. But he agreed that the defendant should have been able to impeach Chief Lewis with the statements in the reports. Chief Lewis' testimony on direct opened the door to him being impeached with the reports.

I am afraid that the majority's opinion will make a mess of the law regarding the admissibility of statements within police reports. 

The majority also concluded that the trial judge should not have allowed plaintiff's economist expert (Dr. Glenda Glover) to base her loss of future earnings analysis on national averages because there was evidence that the decedent earned less than the national average. All justices concurred except for Justice Kitchens.

I thought that the majority got it right on this issue. Sometimes proving lost earnings might require the use of a national average because there is no other evidence to base an opinion on in a particular case. But the national average should not be used as a damages floor when there is evidence that the decedent earned less than the national average. Just as someone who earned more than the national average should be allowed to recover more for loss of future earnings, someone who earned less should recover less.

Finally, the majority found that race was improperly interjected into the economist's testimony by referring to the “Mississippi Black Effect.” I agree with the majority that this was improper. Even if this was not intentional, this sounds like the playing of a race card during trial, which is a big no-no.  

Bad Day for Plaintiffs At Miss. S. Ct.-- Court Saves Caps Question for Another Day

Saturday Update:  The title is a poor choice of words. People are interpreting it as meaning that the decisions were bad for plaintiffs in other cases. That is not what I meant.

I meant that the decisions were bad for the plaintiffs in these cases. I did not mean that the decisions were anti-plaintiff or made changes in the law that are bad for plaintiffs in other cases.

Plaintiff's lost two substantial verdicts today at the Miss. S. Ct.

The much anticipated Lymas v. Double Quick case involving a challenge to Mississippi's damages caps was reversed and rendered on liability. Here is the opinion. Here is the early report by Scoop Bardwell.

Meanwhile, Jackson attorney Ashley Ogden had a $3 million Hinds County premises liability verdict reversed and remanded. Here is the opinion.

I will have commentary on these major decisions in a later post.

Update: I've now read the opinions and judge them [pardon the pun] to be well written and very interesting. Neither case makes substantive changes to premises liability law. 

Tom Freeland (NMC) invented the wheel on the analysis of the Double Quick case. Here is his post about the decision, which links his prior posts that correctly predicted that the plaintiff would lose on liability and that the Court would not reach the caps issue. 

Here is my report on the oral argument in Double Quick, where I noted that the Justices focused on liability issues. Freeland predicted that the case would fall on liability well before the oral argument.

The Ogden case (Rebelwood Apartments) wasn't even decided on premises liability concepts. It went down based on evidentiary and Daubert issues.

I hope to discuss each case individually next week.

Finally, an honest to goodness jury verdict report is coming to Mississippi. I have seen the first issue and will link it next week. It should be a great resource for Mississippi lawyers and will give us much more systematic reporting on verdicts than the current haphazard reporting in newspapers, blogs and courthouse rumor mills.

Miss. Supreme Court Affirms Defense Verdict Against Meth Cook

On Thursday the Miss. Supreme Court affirmed a 2008 Bolivar County defense verdict in Utz v. Running and Rolling Trucking Inc. Here is the Court’s opinion.

The case is noteworthy for its facts. It involved the 2003 death of Preston Utz when he rear-ended an 18–wheeler on Highway 61 in Bolivar County. The decedent had been awake for days at the time of the collision from cooking and smoking crystal meth. Talk about a bad plaintiff. The jury determined that any negligence on the defendant’s part was not a proximate cause of the accident.

The plaintiff raised forty-two (42) issues on appeal. The result was a 58–page opinion even though the decision was unanimous.

Justice Chandler wrote the Court's opinion. Chief Justice Waller and Justice Dickinson did not participate. Jason Strong and Steve Hazzard with Daniel Coker represented the defendant. Ashley Ogden and Wendy Yuan of Jackson represented the plaintiff.

Some lawyers believe that an appeal should be limited to a few issues. Others believe in identifying as many issues as possible. In recent years, I have heard at least one Mississippi Supreme Court Justice encourage lawyers to raise all potential issues on appeal. But in this case, it didn’t help and the Court affirmed the verdict. It will be interesting to see if forty-two appeal issues is a trend in civil cases.

Court of Appeals Reverses Defense Verdict Due to Daubert, Closing Argument and Jury Instruction Issues

The Mississippi Court of Appeals issued an interesting opinion on Tuesday and reversed a trial court defense jury verdict in Denham v. Holmes. Here is the Court’s opinion. Presiding Judge Joseph Lee wrote the Court’s opinion. The decision was unanimous, but with several unexplained partial concurrences, which I will discuss later.

Tommy Defer and Bobby Vance represented the plaintiffs. John Hyneman represented the defendant.

Facts

The case involved a car wreck on University Avenue in Oxford. Denham was turning onto the avenue and collided with a pickup truck driven by Holmes. Both vehicles were totaled and the plaintiffs suffered injuries.

Daubert Issue 

Plaintiffs designated Donald Rawson to testify as an expert witness in traffic-collision reconstruction. Rawson was to testify by deposition and the parties stipulated that Rawson was qualified to give an expert opinion on the traffic accident. But at trial, the defendant moved to exclude Rawson’s testimony on the basis that it would not aid the jury in reaching its decision.

Incidentally, I find the procedure leading to the defendant’s objection at trial odd. I suspect that the plaintiff’s attorneys went into trial thinking that they had an agreement for the expert to testify by deposition when the defendant stipulated to Rawson’s expertise and use of the deposition at trial. But there was a challenge to the testimony waiting for them at trial.  

Plaintiffs responded to the defense argument by contending that Rawson’s testimony would assist the jury on technical issues such as speed, sight line, and distance between the vehicles. Specifically, Rawson opined that the defendant could have taken evasive action to avoid the collision.

The trial court excluded the testimony on the grounds that Rawson’s conclusions were based on insufficient facts and data and some of the opinions were legal conclusions that would invade the province of the jury.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the testimony was based on the facts available from the accident scene and should have been admitted.

I previously criticized the Supreme Court for adopting new Daubert rules. Some have disagreed with my position and I understand their point. But it's my preference that appellate courts simply apply Daubert like the Court of Appeals did here without creating new Daubert rules.

Improper Closing Argument Issue 

 The Court held that it was also reversible error for the trial court to allow defense counsel to comment on the plaintiff’s lack of expert testimony in closing argument. The Court reasoned that the only legitimate purpose of closing argument is to assist the jury in evaluating the evidence and understanding the law and that defense counsel’s comment crossed the line. Trial lawyers need to be aware of this decision when they make closing arguments.

It’s easy for a trial lawyer to get carried away during closing and say something that they technically should not say. I know that I have to fight these urges during closing and am probably not always successful. But no one wants to lose a verdict due to an improper argument, particularly since the benefits of closing arguments are debatable.

My personal belief formed from my trial experience is that jurors have almost always made up their mind before the case reaches closing argument. I often find myself telling co-counsel and/or clients deep into a trial that while I don’t know the jury’s decision, I feel like it has been made. Published statistics support this conclusion and show that most jurors make up their mind during opening statements or shortly after opening.

Luckily, this case would have been reversed regardless of the closing argument issue, due to the Daubert and (uninteresting) jury instruction issues. But I appreciate the Court addressing the issue in its opinion to give guidance to trial attorneys.

Conclusion

Finally, this is a case where I hated to see all the partial concurrences. With several distinct issues in play it would have been nice to have the concurring opinions explained.   

Miss. Court of Appeals Rules that a Party who Lost Motion in Limine Waives Objection by Mentioning the Evidence at Trial

In a 5–4 [correction: 4-5-1] decision in Wright v. Royal Carpet Services, the Mississippi Court of Appeals ruled on Tuesday that a party who loses a motion in limine waives their objection to the admission of the disputed evidence by being the first to refer to the evidence at trial. The case was an appeal from a defense verdict in the Lowndes County Circuit Court. The plaintiff alleged in the case that the defendant was responsible for mold that developed in her house.

The issue of whether the majority is really the majority is discussed here.

Before trial, the plaintiff moved to exclude evidence of liability insurance under the collateral source rule. The trial court denied the motion because the issue was relevant to the defendant’s defense that plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages. All nine judges agreed that this ruling by the trial court was proper and I have no criticism of it.

But the five judge majority ruled that plaintiff waived the issue on appeal by being the first to raise the subject of insurance at trial. Judge Roberts wrote for the majority and was joined by Judges Myers, Griffis, Ishee and Irving (in result only with no separate opinion). The Court ruled that Quinn v. State, 873 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. App. 2003) was on point and that the issue was “procedurally barred by her failure to raise a contemporaneous objection at trial.”  

Judge Maxwell dissented in an opinion joined by Judges King, Lee, Barnes and Carlton. The dissent cited several Mississippi Supreme Court cases that held that where a judge has already ruled on the evidence, a party does not waive an objection by being the first to mention it at trial in order to attempt to take the sting out of the evidence. The dissent characterized the situation as one where the trial court makes an adverse ruling on the motion in limine and the party adjusts their trial strategy by introducing the evidence to limit its ill effects on the jury.

The dissent states:

I believe Wright was entitled to play the hand the court dealt her and that she is not procedurally barred from asserting these issues on appeal.

I agree with the dissent.

First, Quin is not “on point.” Quin did not deal with a situation where a party did not object at trial to the admissibility of evidence where the court had ruled it admissible in ruling on a motion in limine. Quin dealt with the opposite. In Quin, the State violated a motion in limine ruling at trial and the court found that the defendant waived the issue by not objecting at trial:

The State did in fact violate the motion in limine regarding the amount of money Quinn had on her person by specifically questioning Brister about the matter. However, the record is devoid of any objection by Quinn when such question was asked of Brister. Therefore we find that an issue that is not properly brought to the attention of the trial court by appropriate timely objection is waived. Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824, 832 (Miss. 1995). The supreme court has repeatedly held that "if no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived." Id.

There was no violation of a motion in limine in Wright. Instead, plaintiff adjusted her trial strategy to account for the court’s prior ruling.

Second, the dissent’s position has superior support in the case law than does the majority’s position. The majority cites one case that arguably does not apply at all. The dissent cites several Mississippi Supreme Court cases that support the dissent’s view.

Third, the majority ignores “reality on the ground” in the courtroom. it has been my experience that trial judges get annoyed fast when lawyers repeatedly object on the same issue. Trial judges seem to consider the issue to be preserved for appeal once an objection has been made and an adverse ruling issued. A motion in limine that has been ruled on should count as lodging an objection and in my experience, it has. I have seen plenty of times when a lawyer stands up and asks: “judge, I lost on my motion in limine, I don’t have to keep objecting do I?” Invariably the answer is “no—your objection is noted in the record” and usually the opposing attorney is shaking his/her head in agreement. Lawyers should not have to keep objecting repeatedly for fear of waiving the objection. It slows trials down and annoys both the judge and jury.

Finally, a valid reason for filing a motion in limine is to determine what evidence will be in play at trial. The party that loses should be entitled to adjust their trial strategy to account for the ruling. A party being the first to mention damning evidence is a trial strategy that is routinely taught in trial practice courses and practiced in the courtroom. According to the Court of Appeals, you cannot do it in Mississippi because if you do, you have waived your objection to the evidence.

That doesn’t seem fair. I agree with the dissent’s analogy that at that point, you are simply playing the hand that you are dealt. 

I would like to hear what other trial attorneys think about this decision.       

Miss. Supreme Court Vacates Two Verdicts in One Case Due to Confused Jury

On Thursday the Mississippi Supreme Court vacated two Jones County jury verdicts rendered in one trial in Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. v. Malone and remanded the case for further proceedings. Here is the Court's opinion. Justice Lamar wrote for the Court.

 The case stemmed from Gary Malone's right leg amputation two years after he suffered a work-related injury. Malone sued Gallagher and his employer Nabors Drilling. Malone alleged that defendants committed a bad-faith delay in paying his workers comp. claim, causing a delay in medical treatment that led to the amputation of his leg.

Nabors filed a cross-claim against Gallagher and entered into a Mary Carter agreement with Malone under which Nabors admitted to bad-faith (by Gallagher) and paid Malone $1.5 million in exchange for the first $250,000 of any sums that Malone recovered from Gallagher and half of any additional sums recovered.

Malone’s claim and Nabors’s cross-claim were tried together. The jury rendered a verdict for Malone on his claim and awarded $250,000 in damages with fault apportioned among Gallagher (42.5%), Nabors (42.5%) and Malone (15%). The trial court entered final judgments against Nabors and Gallagher in the amounts of $106,250 each.

In a separate verdict the jury found for Nabors on its cross-claim against Gallagher and awarded damages in the amount of $1.25 million. The trial court did not submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury.

The Court found that the two verdicts were inconsistent and, therefore, the jury had to be confused. One jury instruction stated that in order to find for Nabors on its cross-claim the jury must find that nothing Nabors did contributed to Malone’s damages. But the jury both assessed fault to Nabors (42.5%) and found for Nabors on its cross-claim. The Court could not reconcile these inconsistent verdicts and vacated both verdicts and remanded the case.

The Court “strongly urge[d]” the trial court to sever Nabors’s cross-claim so that Malone’s claim and Nabors’s cross-claim are not tried in the same proceeding. You have to feel for the trial judge on this point [Judge Billy Joe Landrum], since no party asked for separate trials.

Notwithstanding the loss of his leg, you don't have to feel particularly sorry for the plaintiff and his attorneys, since they get to keep the $1.5 million that Nabors already paid to plaintiff.

 All participating justices concurred except for Justice Chandler, who argued in a dissent that the judgment against Gallagher should be reversed and rendered due to a lack of evidence of gross negligence, malice or reckless disregard.    

Miss. Supreme Court Affirms Hinds County Defense Verdict

The Supreme Court did not issue many opinions today, but did affirm a defense verdict in Solanki v. Ervin. The case was a car wreck case involving an accident on I-220 in Jackson that resulted in a death. A Hinds County jury returned a defense verdict in 2008 and the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed in a lengthy opinion authored by Justice Graves. Don Evans represented the plaintiffs and Roy Lidell the defendant.

The most notable aspect of the case to me was how fast it flew through the court system. The accident was on March 29, 2007. Plaintiffs filed the complaint on April 10, 2007. The trial was on April 8, 2008 with the verdict returned on April 11. Post trial motion were filed and were denied on May 2, 2008. Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on May 30, 2008. The case was fully briefed on April 8, 2009 and submitted to the court without oral argument on July 8, 2009. The Supreme Court ruled on August 27, 2009. The whole case went from accident to having the appeal decided in a little over two years. That is fast. 

Alienation of Affection Cause of Action Defined

The Leisha Pickering alienation of affection lawsuit is bringing attention to this little used cause of action. The theory is without question alive and well in Mississippi. In August 2008 the Mississippi Supreme Court issued its opinion in Pierce v. Cook, a case that involved claims for alienation of affection and intentional infliction of emotional distress. A Rankin County jury rendered a $1.5 million verdict for the plaintiff and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court listed the elements of an alienation of affection claim as:

1. wrongful conduct of the Defendant;

2. loss of affection or consortium and

3. causal connection between the conduct and loss.

The plaintiff's burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence--not a higher standard such as clear and convincing evidence.

Court of Appeals affirms jury verdict for Goodyear one week after affirming seperate verdict against Goodyear

Last week the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed a $2.1 million verdict against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in a defective tire case in Copiah County. The Associated Press later botched its analysis of the Court's decision.

This week a unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed a 2005 Washington County jury verdict in favor of Goodyear in Oliver v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. Judge Lee wrote the Court's opinion. Goodyear's defense counsel was a team of lawyers from Watkins & Eager that included David Ayers and Jimmy Wilkins.

The facts of the two cases were similar in some respects. In both cases the vehicle was speeding when a tire burst, leading to an accident where the un-belted driver was thrown from the vehicle and died. But that is where the similarities end. In the Copiah County case, the tire was new and had been properly maintained and serviced, including a few days before the accident. In the Washington County case, there was "considerable testimony at trial" that the decedent failed to properly maintain the tire. These differences apparently made a big difference in the trial court verdicts.

In the Washington County case the jury disagreed on whether the tire was defective, but unanimously agreed that a defective tire was not the proximate cause of the accident. The Court of Appeals can make a compelling argument that it is fair to everyone when it affirms a verdict against Goodyear one week and affirms a verdict for Goodyear the next week. Notice that as in the decision last week, the Court did not agree or disagree with the jury. Instead, the Court evaluated whether there was reversible error and determined that there was not. It will be interesting to see if this decision gets any press, since defense verdicts and appellate decisions affirming defense verdicts typically receive less press that plaintiff's verdicts.  

 

Miss. Supreme Court Affirms Two Jury Verdicts

On Thursday the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed two jury verdicts.

The first was Young v. Guild, which was a medical malpractice case against a psychiatrist. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to prevent the suicide of one of his patients. In 2004 a jury in the Circuit Court of Yazoo County rendered a defense verdict at the end of a three day trial. Defense counsel was Whit Johnson and plaintiff's counsel was Ronald Kirk. The Court affirmed the judgment with Justice Chandler authoring the majority opinion joined by Justices Carlson, Randolph, Kitchens and Pierce. Justice Graves concurred in the result only and Justice Lamar dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Dickinson.

The appeal issues involved jury instructions, apportionment and the admission of evidence. The Court found that the plaintiff waived apportionment by not raising it in an interrogatory response, that the jury instructions were proper and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the evidentiary rulings. The dissent argued that the trial court's jury instructions did not properly set forth plaintiff's theory of the case. It's pretty rare for me to believe that jury instructions materially altered the outcome of a trial, so I am putting this case in the category of "move along folks, there's not much to see here." It looks like the defendant won fair and square. 

The second case was Horseshoe Casino v. Mitchell, which was a casino slip and fall case that resulted in a January 2008 jury verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $56,000 in the Circuit Court of  Tunica County. Unaccustomed to losing, the casino appealed. To me, if you are going to appeal a $56,000 jury verdict you should be real sure that there was error, since the attorney's fees and expenses in connection with the appeal will be significant. There is a reason that appeals courts aren't deciding many appeals from county court.

The main issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly excluded evidence of a collateral source. The Court found that there is a narrow impeachment exception to the collateral source rule, but the trial court correctly did not apply the exception in this case. Justice Randolph wrote the Court's majority opinion. Justice Dickinson wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Kitchens wrote a dissent joined by Justice Waller that argued that there should be no exceptions to the collateral source rule. The main take away from this case is that unlike on the casino floor, the casino can actually lose at the courthouse.

Associated Press misstates Court of Appeals' Ruling in Defective Tire Case

The Clarion-Ledger website contains the A.P. story on the $2.1 million verdict against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. that I discussed in an earlier post. While the AP correctly stated the facts of the case, it misstated the ruling of the Mississippi Court of Appeals.

The statement that I have trouble with is the following:

The young men’s families — and a jury — blamed the accident on a faulty tire on the Chevrolet Camaro rather than excessive speed and the beer the men had been drinking.

The Mississippi Court of Appeals agreed this week and upheld a $2.1 million verdict against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. and Big 10 Tire Co.


The Court of Appeals neither agreed nor disagreed with the jury's verdict. Instead, the Court considered the issues raised on appeal by Goodyear and found that there was no reversible error. The Court was required by law to give deference to the jury's decision and could only reverse if there was no evidence to support the prevailing party and reasonable jurors could not have ruled in the prevailing parties' favor. Since the jury found for the plaintiffs, the Court was required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.  Applying this standard, the Court found that the jury's decision was supported by sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict.

The Court could not and did not simply read the trial transcript and decide whether the Court thought that the jury got it right. Appellate judges do not substitute their assessment of the evidence for the jury's assessment. The Court's fifty-six page opinion cited substantial evidence that supported the jury's verdict. If the Court had found reversible error, it likely would have been related to jury instructions or other procedural rulings by the trial court. This would have resulted in a new trial, not a judgment in favor of Goodyear. It would be nice to see the news media recognize this important distinction.

 

Court of Appeals affirms $2.1 million defective tire verdict

On Tuesday the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed a $2.1 million Copiah County Circuit Court jury verdict in favor of three plaintiffs against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. Judge Forrest Johnson presided over the trial because Judge Lamar Pickard recused himself from the case. Judge King wrote the majority opinion, which was fifty-six pages long. Judges Griffis and Barnes dissented without an opinion and Judge Carlton wrote an opinion concurring in result only. It looks like plaintiff's lead counsel at trial was Mike Allred and Goodyear's was Michael Baxter of Copeland Cook.

The case involved a car crash that killed one young man and injured two others. The driver was intoxicated and the car was traveling at between 88-92 mph when a back rear tire failed and the car crashed. It was undisputed that there was a tire failure. Plaintiff argued that there was a breach of warranty because the tire should have been safe up to 112 mph, but fell apart because of the car's speed. Goodyear argued that the tire hit an object that caused the failure and that the driver could have averted the crash if he had been sober.

The Court rejected all eight of Goodyear's appeal issues, which covered the water front. One interesting point was that the trial judge granted more than one form of the verdict instruction. One was a general verdict form and another was for apportionment of fault to the driver. The jury returned its verdict in general form with no allocation of fault. It makes sense to have more than one form of the verdict form for that situation, but I have always thought in terms of there having to be only one form of the verdict instruction and cannot recall having a trial with more than one.

Another interesting issue involved a jury instruction that Goodyear objected to, but the Court found that the objection was not specific enough and was therefore waived.

It will not be surprising to see the Supreme Court take this case given the size of the verdict and numerous issues. If so, Justice Kitchens will not participate, since he was one of the plaintiffs' attorneys.

 

Miss. S. Ct. affirms $6.9 million judgment

On Thursday the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed a $6,925,000 judgment against Franklin Corporation, which is a furniture manufacturer. $5 million of the verdict was for punitive damages. Here is the opinion and the Clarion-Ledger article reporting the decision. The initial Ledger article incorrectly states that the judgment was for $3.76 million. Justice Randolph wrote for the Court, with Justices Graves and Dickinson writing concurring opinions. There was no dissent.

The Circuit Court of Calhoun County (Judge Howorth) rendered the judgment in July 2007. The jury's verdict was $9.5 million and the trial court reduced the amount to $6.925 million before entering the judgment. The four plaintiffs alleged that they suffered injuries as a result of Franklin's use of a hazardous glue in its facility and failure to adequately ventilate the facility.

The bulk of the Court's opinion on appeal dealt with the issue of whether Franklin could be liable outside the workers' comp. act under the intentional tort exception. The Court sided with the trial court's determination that there was a fact question for the jury on the claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. If the Court had found that workers' comp. was the exclusive remedy, the plaintiffs would not have been able to recover anything in circuit court.

This will be a controversial decison. Employers are going to hate the decision, since most would have assumed that workers' comp. would have been the exclusive remedy for the employees. The Supreme Court's response to that probably would be that they were just applying Mississippi statutory law and that it is the legislature's job to change the law.

Court of Appeals affirms $350,000 jury verdict

On Tuesday the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed a $350,000 jury verdict in APAC v. Johnson. The verdict was from the Circuit Court of Washington County. The facts were that an APAC truck hit a power line, causing a pole to fall on plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiff had to be removed from the vehicle with the jaws of life and suffered C6 and C7 fractures. The plaintiff's medicals were $12,621.34. APAC admitted liability.

APAC's numerous appellate issues included whether the trial court should have allowed treating physicians to testify as fact witnesses and whether the verdict was excessive. A unanimous court of appeals affirmed the verdict.

Regarding the amount of the verdict, the Court stated that the jury has "broad leeway" when it comes to a damages award. The Court did not find bias, passion or prejudice due to the evidence that the plaintiff had a fractured vertebrae, ongoing pain and limitation of her former activities.

MC Law Review examines Mississippi Supreme Court voting patterns

In 2008 the Mississippi College Law Review published the results of its 2008 Judicial Administration Project. You can access the the results of the study here.

The study examined Mississippi Supreme Court opinions in civil cases starting on January 1, 2004. During this time period the Court reversed twice as many plaintiff verdicts (176) as defense verdicts (86). In addition, the Court affirmed 43% of verdicts for plaintiffs (134 of 310) compared to 69% of the verdicts for defendants (195 of 281). Interestingly, trial court judges and juries were more balanced than the Supreme Court, rendering 310 verdicts for the plaintiff and 281 for the defense.

The study contained the following important disclaimer:  

Take note that this chart displays the disposition of ALL civil cases.  It does not reflect the court's dispositions on any particular topic.  Instead, it includes everything from contract disputes to domestic issues to will contests.  Procedural matters, including appeals from summary judgment and motions to dismiss, are likewise incorporated.

Because the study included all civil actions and was not limited to jury verdicts involving a business interest against an individual, it does not squarely address the controversy raised by former Mississippi Bar President and highly respected Jackson lawyer, Alex Alston. According to Alston, in the 4 1/2 years prior to June 2008 the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed 88% of jury verdicts that favored wronged victims. During the same time period, the Court reversed 0% of jury verdicts that favored big business. 

The MC study does not refute Alston's criticisms and suggests that Alston had a valid point. Hopefully, the Law Review will continue its analysis to further explore these important questions. The civil justice system does not efficiently resolve disputes when either side has reason to believe that the deck will be stacked in its favor on appeal.