Court of Appeals Opinion Stands in Baptist Hospital v. Kelly

In December I wrote here and here about Baptist Hospital v. Kelly. This was the case where the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed a $4.6 million jury verdict in a Hinds County medical malpractice case a few weeks after the parties agreed to settle. Based on a few things I've heard, I believe that the settlement had not been finalized yet when Court issued its opinion.

My second post on the case noted that the docket reflected a motion to vacate the Court's opinion. Although my earlier post is a bit unclear on this point, the motion to vacate was not a joint motion. On January 10, 2012 the Court issued this order granting Baptist's counsel's motion to withdraw and taking no action on the motion to vacate opinion.

Best I can tell, this means that the Court's opinion remains on the books and is good law. That is good news for lawyers who want to cite the case in the future.

 

Miss. Court of Appeals Affirms Defense Verdict in Toyota Motor Vehicle Products Liability Case

Last week the Miss. Court of Appeals affirmed a 2008 Hinds County defense verdict in Clark v. Toyota Motor Sales. Here is the Court's opinion

The basis of the case was a 2001 auto-accident in DeSoto County involving a Toyota truck. Part of the appeal centered on Toyota's exemplar truck that Judge Winston Kidd allowed jurors to view in front of the courthouse.  

Wayne Ferrell and a bunch of other lawyers represented the plaintiffs. David Ayers and other Watkins Eager lawyers represented Toyota.

Judge David Ishee wrote the Court's unanimous opinion.

My Take:

This is an example of the fact that it's common for defendants to win civil cases in Hinds County. Usually it's the big plaintiff verdicts that make the paper. But defendants win trials in Hinds County all the time.

$4.6 Million Med-Mal Verdict Settled Before Court of Appeals Affirmed Verdict

Last week I wrote about the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirming a $4,691,000 verdict against Baptist Hospital in a wrongful death case. I later heard that the case actually settled a few weeks before the Court issued its opinion. It's my understanding that the case settled for an amount in the neighborhood of $2.8 million.

The Court of Appeals docket shows that two days after the Court issued its opinion, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss appeal and a motion to vacate the Court's opinion.

 To review, here is the chronology:

  • 2000:                 alleged medical malpractice occurred
  • 2001:                 lawsuit filed
  • June 2009:          $4,691,000 verdict
  • late Nov. 2011:    case settled for approx. $2.8 million
  • Dec. 13, 2011:     Court of appeals affirmed verdict.
  • Dec. 15, 2011:     joint motion to vacate appeal.

It's interesting that Baptist settled the case 11 years after the incident occurred—but 2 weeks before the Court issued an opinion affirming the verdict.

Chancellor Gene Fair Appointed to Court of Appeals

Gov. Barbour appointed Chancellor Gene Fair of Hattiesburg to the Mississippi Court of Appeals on Wednesday to fill the term of the retiring Judge William Meyers. Here is the Clarion-Ledger article on the appointment. Judge Fair has served as a chancellor since 2007 of the district that covers Forrest, Lamar, Marion, Pearl River and Perry counties.

I have not appeared before Judge Fair and do not know him. But for some reason, he sounds fair.   

I strongly favor former chancellors holding some of the seats on the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. Chancery court law is often a lot different from Circuit Court law—as I am often reminded when I have to venture into chancery court.

It makes sense to have former chancellors on the appellate courts. I have heard numerous lawyers express similar sentiments over the years. 

And how can you do better than a judge named Fair? If I were him, my campaign slogan would be: "Keep it Fair." 

Mississippi Court of Appeals Affirms $4,691,000 Jury Verdict Against Baptist Hospital in Wrongful Death Case

On Tuesday the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed a $4.6 million Hinds County jury verdict in Miss. Baptist Health Systems v. Kelly. Here is the Court's opinion. This was the appeal of a 2009 trial that I wrote about in this 2009 post.

This was a pre-tort reform cap case. Ellen Kelly died as a result of exposure to latex during a surgery procedure at Baptist Hospital in Jackson. A form from an earlier surgery procedure indicated that Ellen was allergic to latex. The jury rendered a verdict against Baptist, but exonerated the doctor defendants.

The awarded damages were:

  • $29,604.52– funeral and medical expenses
  • $992,109– loss of household services
  • $1,415,880– lost wages
  • $2,253,065.48– pain and suffering

A big part of Baptist's appeal seemed to center on the fact that the jury exonerated the doctor-defendants, who also had a duty to take a proper history from Ellen. The Court rejected the argument finding that the doctors and nurses had a separate duty.

Baptist also complained because the trial court did not allow the jury to apportion fault to an anesthesiologist. I can't tell for sure, but Baptist may have been trying a version of the sneaky finger-pointing defense that I talked about in this post. The Court rejected this argument because there was no testimony suggesting that the anesthesiologist deviated from the standard of care.

Judge Ishee wrote the majority opinion. Judge Maxwell wrote a specially concurring opinion. Judge Carlton dissented based on her assessment that the plaintiff did not prove medical causation.

Joey Diaz, Christopher Williams and Dennis Sweet represented the plaintiff. Mike Wallace and a bunch of other lawyers from Wise Carter represented Baptist. Judge Winston Kidd was the trial judge.

Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee Should Accept Applications from Scanners

Judge Primeaux's blog has the story this morning about Court of Appeals Judge William Myers resigning effective December 31, 2011:

COA Judge William Myers has submitted his resignation, effective December 31, 2011.

The replacement appointee will be from the district comprising Forrest, George, Greene, Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Lamar, Pearl River, Perry, Stone and parts of Wayne counties.

Wouldn’t it be grand if the appointee were a chancellor? Of course, to be appointed, one has to apply for the job.

For those interested in the position:

Anyone interested in applying should send 12 copies of their resume and 12 copies of their writing sample by Nov. 9 to Ed Brunini Jr., Chairman of the Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee, at P.O. Box 119, Jackson, MS 39205. Anyone interested in recommending prospective candidates should send their letters of recommendation to Mr. Brunini at the same address.

My Take:

Twelve copies? 12? in 2011? For a committee that has 31 members? How exactly does that math work?

The judicial appointment advisory committee should also accept applications for a scanner. The committee can use this “scanner” to “scan” the 1 resume and writing sample from applicants. They can then be emailed to the committee members.

Better yet, why not just ask applicants to email their resume and writing sample to Mr. Brunini? Or his assistant if he is too old school to crank a computer.

In all seriousness, I agree with Judge Primeaux that former chancellors are under represented on the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. There are plenty of good chancellors in Judge Myers' district and it would be nice to see one of them get the appointment.

Finally, I wonder who will make the appointment? Governor Barbour or Governor Bryant?

Governor Barbour Fills Court of Appeals Seat While I am Out of Town

Another week-long trial. Another loss. I seem to be getting better at losing trials. Since I agree with NMC that it's bad form to blog about your own cases, you'll have to read about it in the Mississippi Jury Verdict Reporter.

Is it just me, or does anyone else's brain feel like a scrambled egg after a long trial? Win or lose.

Meanwhile, in a blatant attempt to avoid commentary on this blog, Governor Barbour filled the the vacant Court of Appeals seat while I was out of town. Here is a link to the the Clarion-Ledger article about Barbour appointing former Hinds County Circuit Judge Ermea “EJ” Russell to the Court. She replace Chief Judge Leslie King, who Barbour promoted to the Supreme Court.

My Take:

I don't have much of a take on this. I do not know Russell and never practiced before her while she was on the Hinds County bench. 

I heard a lot of speculation about who might fill King's seat before Barbour appointed King to the Supreme Court. I heard little to no speculation about the position after the actual King appointment. But I really didn't go looking for information on it either.

My general sense is that Russell was not previously on most lawyer's radar. This means that most people don't have strong feelings about her appointment one way or the other. That may be a good thing. It will allow Judge Russell to be judged by her work on the Court without pre-conceived notions about her bias or abilities.

Court of Appeals Reverses $130,000 Weiner Dog Attack Verdict

In a glorious victory for wiener dogs everywhere, on Tuesday a unanimous Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed and rendered a $130,000 Clay County jury verdict for the victim of a near-miss wiener dog attack. Here is the Court's decision in Penny Pinchers v. Outlaw. I'm serious. That's the name of the case.

Facts:

Sophie was a 4 month old wiener dog.

I obtained an exclusive photo of a representative 4-month old wiener dog puppy, pictured to the right. Might as well of named her Killer.

Sophie's owner took her to work with her at Penny Pinchers. The rest is history. Outlaw—being afraid of dogs—ran for the back of the store upon entering and hearing Sophie bark. Outlaw could hear Sophie's claws on the floor and, I presume, her jaws snapping.

When Outlaw saw it was little Sophie, she laughed and resumed shopping. Large quantities of catfish and sugar were on her list. But Outlaw was soon hysterical with pain in her bum hip. An ambulance was dispatched. The lawsuit followed.

Trial:

A Clay County jury apportioned 70% of fault to Penny Pinchers and 30% to Outlaw and awarded $130,000 in damages.

The Appeal:

The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered based on the finding that there was no dangerous condition.

Judge Kenny Griffis wrote the pack's majority's opinion. Wayne Williams of Tupelo represented the defendant. Rod Richmond and Chynee Bailey represented the Plaintiff.

My Take:

This will go down in history as a landmark verdict….for wiener dogs. There are some real troublemakers in the wiener dog breed. The Court's opinion gives them a license to chase customers around stores throughout Mississippi with impunity. But in a state where most of the population is armed, this could still end badly for the wiener dogs.  

Miss. Ct. of Appeals Affirms Default Judgement for Incorrect Interrogatory Response

On Tuesday the Mississippi Court of Appeals issued a controversial decision in City of Jackson v. Rhaly. Here is the Court's opinion.

Facts:

The case was a lawsuit against the City for flood damages after a creek overflowed because it was not properly maintained. In interrogatory responses the plaintiffs requested any standard operating procedures which govern the site of the incident. The City's response was: none and that the City would supplement on receipt of further information. Sometime later, the City supplemented the response to identify a procedure without producing it. A week before the trial the plaintiff found the procedure in the clerk's office while researching another case.

This all happened back in the early 2000's before the current City Attorney or anyone working in his office worked in the office.

The plaintiff moved for a default judgment for discovery abuses and Hinds County Circuit Judge Swan Yerger granted the motion. Judge Yerger determined that the City's actions were not willful and wacked them anyway due to their neglect. He awarded $149,872 in damages, $31,226 in attorney's fees and $3,862 in expenses.

Court of Appeals Decision:

Judge Ishee wrote the Court's 5–3 opinion. The Court cited the following factors to consider when determine whether a dismissal was justified. My commentary is in brackets:

  1. the failure to comply with the court's order resulted from willfulness or bad faith; [factor clearly not met: there was no order and trial court found it was not willful];
  2. the deterrent value of Rule 37 cannot be substantially achieved through a less severe sanction; [factor not present];
  3. whether the other party's preparation for trial was substantially prejudiced; [nothing in opinion suggested this factor was present; court of appeals said maybe-but decided that this factor does not have to be present]
  4. dismissal may be inappropriate when neglect caused by lawyer rather than client; [pretty obvious that it was the fault of the lawyers in prior administration].

The Court discussed these factors and determined that dismissal was appropriate.

Pieter Teeuwissen and Claire Hawkins represented the City. William Joseph Kerley and John Clark represented the plaintiffs.

Judge Irving dissented joined by Judges Griffis and Maxwell.

My Take:

Judge Yerger had a reputations as perhaps the most defense leaning trial judge in the state. Except when the City of Jackson was a defendant.

I was shocked by this decision. Early indications are that I was not alone in Jackson legal circles. These are not the facts where I would  expect to see a default judgment granted for discovery abuses. In fact, I wouldn't even expect to see a motion filed.

There was no order violated and the plaintiff obtained the documents before trial. Also, the plaintiff did not articulate any real prejudice or move for a continuance. The fact that the plaintiff could have used the documents in depositions and “so forth” could have been handled by a continuance and more depositions at the City's expense.

Parties producing documents shortly before a trial is not uncommon. Sometimes this appears to be gamesmanship. Other times, not. Most of the time, the attorney on the receiving end complains to the Court, but rarely is anything done. Honestly, I didn't know that a default judgment was even possible for what happened here. I'm not condoning it. And I think that attorneys are getting more and more lax in responding to discovery and supplementing their responses. But I am very surprised by the result.

I will probably have more analysis of this opinion in a future post.  

Supreme Court Revisits Court of Appeals Decision on Improper Closing Arguments, Daubert

Last year I discussed the Court of Appeals decision in Denham v. Holmes in this post. The Court of appeals reversed a Lafayette County defense verdict due to issues related to Daubert, defense counsel's closing arguments and jury instructions. On Thursday the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in this opinion. But the Court disagreed with much of the Court of Appeals opinion.

As a refresher:

The case involved a car wreck on University Avenue in Oxford. Denham was turning onto the avenue and collided with a pickup truck driven by Holmes. Both vehicles were totaled and the plaintiffs suffered injuries.

The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals that it was reversible error for the trial court to allow defense counsel to comment in closing on the plaintiff's lack of expert testimony. Plaintiff's counsel referred to the expected testimony in opening, but the trial court did not allow the expert to testify. The Court determined that the comments were proper. The Court reasoned that:

“acting at their own peril, the plaintiffs invited this comment by informing the jury during opening statement that they would provide expert testimony during trial but failing to do so.”

The Court noted:

“The reality of our advocacy system is that the purpose of a party's presentation of evidence and the comments of that party's counsel, throughout the trial, is to aid that party's case, and to 'prejudice' (be detrimental to) the other party's case.” 

The Court reasoned that just because an argument hurts the other side's case does not mean that the argument is improper. Although the Court did not mention Rule of Evidence 403, I could see this language being cited in disputes involving that rule.

The Court also disagreed with the Court of Appeals' Daubert analysis. The Court agreed that the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff's accident reconstructionist to testify about his distance and timing estimates. But the Court disagreed that the expert should have been allowed to testify about causation because the opinions were not sufficiently reliable.

  Justice Carlson wrote the majority opinion. Justice Kitchens dissented on the Daubert issues and was joined by Justices Dickinson and Randolph.

The Judiciary Pyramid of Mississippi

According to 30 seconds of extensive internet research, it took 30 years to build an Egyptian pyramid. 

 The Mississippi Supreme Court building is on that kind of pace. That, or it's cursed.

 

 

 

Here are a couple of blackberry quality photos of scaffolding going up at the Court late last week:

 

 

My office has been half a block North of the Court for 9 years. There has been construction going on for all 9 years. I don't think that I can remember everything that they've done. They built the new building behind the dump that was the old Supreme Court building. Decorum prohibits me from stating what the old building looked like.

Then…they didn't move in for years. I heard that there weren't funds budgeted to finish the inside of the building. After a few years, they finished the inside of the building and the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and supporting cast moved in. Then they tore down the the old building.  Then the sprinklers went off in the new building and it flooded. Back came the construction crews.

Next, they tore down the old parking garage. The old garage complex made the old building look like a palace. Recently, they finished the grass lawn East of the Court building. That opened everything up between North Congress and the Capital. It looks great.

For months I've been driving down George Street and hoping to not see construction workers in the area. And now this. Scaffolding going up. Apparently, the only job in Mississippi more secure than an Article III judge is a position on the Supreme Court construction crew.

Step 1: Appoint Judge Leslie King to Supreme Court.......Check

Governor Barbour's appointment yesterday of Court of Appeals Chief Judge Leslie King to replace Justice James Graves on the Supreme Court was anticlimactic. It's a bit like hiring an assistant coach on your current staff to replace your head football coach. It may be the best move, but it's not very exciting for the fan base.

Many people predicted King would get the position from the day that President Obama appointed Justice Graves to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals. Gov. Barbour admitted that King was the only candidate who he considered. It is a safe pick and a smart pick.

So who does Barbour appoint to replace King on the Court of Appeals? This is more interesting because there is no one obvious candidate. The people who always predicted King would get promoted to the Supreme Court believe that Barbour will appoint a current African-American state court judge. But there are four judges in Hinds County alone who fit this profile even if you only consider circuit and chancery judges. And the district is much bigger than just Hinds County.

Judge Denise Owens is a name I hear a lot and would be a popular choice. But unlike with the Supreme Court position, Barbour promises to run this pick through his judicial advisory committee. That would seem to make it a more wide open race. And a more interesting appointment from the fans' point of view.

Miss. Court of Appeals Rules that it's Not Cheating if you Don't Get Caught

The Miss. Court of Appeals settled an age old question last week: it's not cheating if you don't get caught(within 3 years)—at least not when it comes to getting sued. Here is the Court's opinion in Cheated on vs. Dude Who Cheated with Spouse.

Facts:

Yep. It's another alienation of affection case. The relevant facts are:

  1. cheating/ affair
  2. affair ends
  3. three years elapses
  4. affair discovered
  5. lawsuit filed

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant. A unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the statute of limitations elapsed because the affair ended more than three years before the filing of the lawsuit. The Court rejected plaintiff's contention that the discovery rule applied.

My Take:  

This was a weird fact pattern involving a goofy cause of action. So we shouldn't be surprised when it led to a questionable decision.

Cheaters everywhere applaud the Court's decision as a sensible limitation on suing people for screwing around. There are probably a lot people who were screwing around with someone else's spouse more than three years ago who are sleeping easier tonight.

Too bad the Court of Appeals did not take advantage of the opportunity to call for the abolishment of the entire cause of action.

Graves to 5th Circuit-- Who is Next Miss. Supreme Court Justice?

With the U.S. Senate approving Justice James Graves' appointment to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals on Monday, attention turns to who Governor Barbour will appoint to replace Graves on the Miss. Supreme Court. I posted on this issue in this post last June. I've had lines in the water for weeks on this issue and do not really have any fresh information on this topic.  

Speculation in Jackson legal circles continues to center on Barbour appointing Graves' replacement from the Mississippi Court of Appeals. Under this theory Barbour will appoint Court of Appeals Chief Judge Leslie King to the Supreme Court, a sitting trial judge to the Court of Appeals and an attorney to replace the trial judge. Hinds County Chancery Judge Denise Owens is a name that I hear as the favorite to replace King on the Court of Appeals if it this happens. Others speculate that Owens could replace Graves on the Supreme Court.

I've gotten mixed signals on the possibility of Jackson attorney La'Verne Edney getting the Supreme Court appointment. I've heard that she does not want the position. And I've heard that she is campaigning for the job. So I've got no idea.

One interesting scenario would be for Barbour to appoint former Hinds County Circuit Judge Malcolm Harrison to one of the available positions. Word on the street is that Barbour was upset with Judge Bill Gowan for running against—and unseating Harrison. Appointing Harrison to another slot would at least put Harrison back into public service.

With Barbour still in the 2012 Presidential race, expect the position to go to an African-American. If Barbour appoints a white person to the Supreme Court, then he's not running for President.

At this point, I have no prediction on what's going to happen here. Let me know if you've heard any interesting rumors on the Supreme Court seat. If requested, I do not reveal the identity of sources. 

Cheap Shots in Trial are OK?

The Court of Appeals concluded 2010 with a decision that bothers me. Here is the Court's opinion in Triplett v. River Region Medical Corp.

Facts:

This was a Warren County medical malpractice case against a hospital, doctor and CRNA. River Region got out on summary judgment and the case was tried in May 2008 before Judge Frank Vollor. The case was tried to a defense verdict and the appeal ensued.  

One of the issues on appeal was whether the trial court should have ordered a mistrial after defense counsel dropped this bomb in opening statement:

“a doctor from Viginia is the only one, apparently, [that Triplett's heirs] could find in the whole United States to testify against [River Region].”

Plaintiff's counsel objected and the trial court sustained the objection and advised the jury to disregard the statement. The next morning plaintiff's counsel moved for a mistrial and the trial court denied the motion.

Tim Porter, Patrick Malouf and Johnny Givens with Porter and Malouf in Ridgeland represented the plaintiff. Gene Parker and Penny Lawson of Vicksburg represented the defendants.

Court of Appeals Decision:

On appeal a unanimous Court ruled that the motion for mistrial was untimely because under Mississippi law the objection and motion must be made contemporaneously with the improper remarks. That didn't really seem fair to me so I did a little research and have come to the conclusion that the Court of Appeals is getting the law wrong on this.

My Take:

First, defense counsel's statement was way out of bounds. The Court could have at least acknowledged that.

More importantly, the Court's decision does not explain the rationale for the contemporaneous objection rule. But the Mississippi Supreme Court did explain the rule in 1997 in Herrington v. State, 690 So. 2d 1132 (Miss. 1997). There the Court explained that “contemporaneousness is critical because it allows the judge to avert a mistrial, if possible, by admonishing the jury to disregard the utterance.”

Given the rationale for the rule, it would seem that a contemporaneous objection alone should be enough to preserve the issue. Case law from other jurisdictions supports this conclusion.

A New Jersey District Court ruled in Lyles v. Flagship Resort Development Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. N.J. 2005) that a contemporaneous objection alone is enough to preserve an issue. The Court observed that the law of the Third Circuit is that an objection alone without a motion for mistrial preserves an issue.

In my opinion the Court of Appeals got this wrong. If the reason for the contemporaneous objection rule is that it gives the judge the opportunity to admonish the jury to disregard the improper statement, then the reason for the rule does not apply in this case. There was a contemporaneous objection and the trial court did admonish the jury. If the reason for the rule does not apply, then the rule should not apply. That's basic common sense.

What really bothers me about this decision is that this involved what appeared to be a planned cheap shot. While I agree that a trial court should not grant a mistrial for every improper statement that attorneys make in trial, I believe that trial courts should err on the side of granting a mistrial when the statement appears to be a planned cheap shot. Otherwise, what disincentive do lawyers have for making cheap shots?  

There was also an issue in the case whether a juror employed by a law firm who represented the hospital should have been struck for cause. The trial court did not and the Court of Appeals affirmed. I also disagree with these rulings.

Having worked at large law firms, I can say without reservation that staff members—at least the ones with a clue—understand where the firm's bread is buttered. Lawyers and their firms are loyal to their clients—-the law requires it—and a law firm employee should not be on a jury deciding the case of one of the firm's clients.    

Army Vet Kelly Mims Opposing Judge Donna Barnes for Court of Appeals

Tupelo lawyer Kelly Mims is challenging Judge Donna Barnes for her Mississippi Court of Appeals post for the Northern District. Judge Barnes has held the position since 2004.

Here is Mims' campaign website.

Mims is a 2000 graduate of the University of Mississippi School of Law. He has worked as a Lee County Public Defender and appears to have primarily practiced criminal defense in private practice.  Ya'll Politics ran Mims' press release announcing his candidacy today.

 Here is Judge Barnes' campaign website.

Although Mims does not have a track record as a judge, I suspect that he would be a moderate to conservative jurist. He appears to have a conservative background and served in the U.S. Army. His stint as a Public Defender is probably more of a reflection of wanting to get good experience as opposed to a statement of judicial or political values. His private practice has been in a small firm, which almost always results in representing more individuals than insurance companies and corporations.  

Judge Barnes was originally appointed to the court and did not have an opponent in her only election. It remains to be seen how either Judge Barnes or Mims perform on the campaign trail. Contested judicial elections in Mississippi often come down to who campaigns the hardest. And by this I mean actually getting out and meeting voters. That could be the case with this one.

Court of Appeals Reverses Defense Verdict Due to Daubert, Closing Argument and Jury Instruction Issues

The Mississippi Court of Appeals issued an interesting opinion on Tuesday and reversed a trial court defense jury verdict in Denham v. Holmes. Here is the Court’s opinion. Presiding Judge Joseph Lee wrote the Court’s opinion. The decision was unanimous, but with several unexplained partial concurrences, which I will discuss later.

Tommy Defer and Bobby Vance represented the plaintiffs. John Hyneman represented the defendant.

Facts

The case involved a car wreck on University Avenue in Oxford. Denham was turning onto the avenue and collided with a pickup truck driven by Holmes. Both vehicles were totaled and the plaintiffs suffered injuries.

Daubert Issue 

Plaintiffs designated Donald Rawson to testify as an expert witness in traffic-collision reconstruction. Rawson was to testify by deposition and the parties stipulated that Rawson was qualified to give an expert opinion on the traffic accident. But at trial, the defendant moved to exclude Rawson’s testimony on the basis that it would not aid the jury in reaching its decision.

Incidentally, I find the procedure leading to the defendant’s objection at trial odd. I suspect that the plaintiff’s attorneys went into trial thinking that they had an agreement for the expert to testify by deposition when the defendant stipulated to Rawson’s expertise and use of the deposition at trial. But there was a challenge to the testimony waiting for them at trial.  

Plaintiffs responded to the defense argument by contending that Rawson’s testimony would assist the jury on technical issues such as speed, sight line, and distance between the vehicles. Specifically, Rawson opined that the defendant could have taken evasive action to avoid the collision.

The trial court excluded the testimony on the grounds that Rawson’s conclusions were based on insufficient facts and data and some of the opinions were legal conclusions that would invade the province of the jury.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the testimony was based on the facts available from the accident scene and should have been admitted.

I previously criticized the Supreme Court for adopting new Daubert rules. Some have disagreed with my position and I understand their point. But it's my preference that appellate courts simply apply Daubert like the Court of Appeals did here without creating new Daubert rules.

Improper Closing Argument Issue 

 The Court held that it was also reversible error for the trial court to allow defense counsel to comment on the plaintiff’s lack of expert testimony in closing argument. The Court reasoned that the only legitimate purpose of closing argument is to assist the jury in evaluating the evidence and understanding the law and that defense counsel’s comment crossed the line. Trial lawyers need to be aware of this decision when they make closing arguments.

It’s easy for a trial lawyer to get carried away during closing and say something that they technically should not say. I know that I have to fight these urges during closing and am probably not always successful. But no one wants to lose a verdict due to an improper argument, particularly since the benefits of closing arguments are debatable.

My personal belief formed from my trial experience is that jurors have almost always made up their mind before the case reaches closing argument. I often find myself telling co-counsel and/or clients deep into a trial that while I don’t know the jury’s decision, I feel like it has been made. Published statistics support this conclusion and show that most jurors make up their mind during opening statements or shortly after opening.

Luckily, this case would have been reversed regardless of the closing argument issue, due to the Daubert and (uninteresting) jury instruction issues. But I appreciate the Court addressing the issue in its opinion to give guidance to trial attorneys.

Conclusion

Finally, this is a case where I hated to see all the partial concurrences. With several distinct issues in play it would have been nice to have the concurring opinions explained.   

Court of Appeals Rejects Latest Lack of Pre-suit Notice Argument

On Tuesday a unanimous Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the Circuit Court of Harrison County’s dismissal of a lawsuit against two physicians for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice statute: Miss. Code Ann. 15–1–36(15). Here is the Court’s opinion in Hans v. Memorial Hospital.

The relevant facts were as follows:

  • April 2006:           alleged negligent medical care
  • March 29, 2007:   complaint filed
  • May 2, 2007:        notice letter sent to two doctors 
  • May 30, 2007:      two doctors dismissed without prejudice based on failure to provide pre-suit notice
  • March 26, 2008:   plaintiffs filed amended complaint joining the two doctors who were dismissed
  • August 27, 2008: circuit court again granted doctors’ motion to dismiss.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the doctors were properly dismissed from the first action, but were provided the necessary notice before the filing of the amended complaint. The doctors contended that this offended the plain meaning of the pre-suit notice statute. The doctors were in essence arguing that the dismissal without prejudice was really with prejudice. That’s a disingenuous argument.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiff and reinstated the action. I agree with the Court of Appeals. The doctors had notice of the action before the filing of the amended complaint that named them as defendants.

The lesson in this opinion for plaintiff lawyers is that the sooner the complaint is filed, the more time you have to address any claimed notice deficiencies. By filing the complaint in this case more than a year before the statute ran against the doctors, the plaintiff had plenty of time to correct the deficiency. Of course, plaintiffs often do not start looking for a lawyer until just before the statute of limitations expires—or even after.  

The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Memorial Hospital on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice against the hospital.

Judge Donna Barnes wrote the Court’s opinion. 

Is the Majority in Wright v. Royal Carpet Really the Majority?

WIll Bardwell raises a great point on the Wright v. Royal Carpet decision that I wrote about earlier today:

Ultimately, though, it may be much ado about nothing, because technically speaking, I'm not sure that the decision creates binding precedent. The Court's opinion drew only five votes -- not a majority of the Court -- and one of its members, Judge Irving, joined in result only. Judge Maxwell's separate opinion, on the other hand, pulled a total of five full votes (why that doesn't make it the "majority" opinion, I don't know). Suffice it to say, though, that a majority of Court's members declined to concur in the lead opinion's reasoning. 

I didn't notice the vote counting issue when I read the opinion. The concurrence, which I mistakenly refer to as the dissent in my post, had five votes. The majority opinion included Judge Irving who concurred in result only. But the concurring judges also concurred in the result. It's how they got there that's in dispute.

And it looks like the concurring opinion is really the majority. I'm missing something on the vote counting at the Court of Appeals.

Miss. Court of Appeals Rules that a Party who Lost Motion in Limine Waives Objection by Mentioning the Evidence at Trial

In a 5–4 [correction: 4-5-1] decision in Wright v. Royal Carpet Services, the Mississippi Court of Appeals ruled on Tuesday that a party who loses a motion in limine waives their objection to the admission of the disputed evidence by being the first to refer to the evidence at trial. The case was an appeal from a defense verdict in the Lowndes County Circuit Court. The plaintiff alleged in the case that the defendant was responsible for mold that developed in her house.

The issue of whether the majority is really the majority is discussed here.

Before trial, the plaintiff moved to exclude evidence of liability insurance under the collateral source rule. The trial court denied the motion because the issue was relevant to the defendant’s defense that plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages. All nine judges agreed that this ruling by the trial court was proper and I have no criticism of it.

But the five judge majority ruled that plaintiff waived the issue on appeal by being the first to raise the subject of insurance at trial. Judge Roberts wrote for the majority and was joined by Judges Myers, Griffis, Ishee and Irving (in result only with no separate opinion). The Court ruled that Quinn v. State, 873 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. App. 2003) was on point and that the issue was “procedurally barred by her failure to raise a contemporaneous objection at trial.”  

Judge Maxwell dissented in an opinion joined by Judges King, Lee, Barnes and Carlton. The dissent cited several Mississippi Supreme Court cases that held that where a judge has already ruled on the evidence, a party does not waive an objection by being the first to mention it at trial in order to attempt to take the sting out of the evidence. The dissent characterized the situation as one where the trial court makes an adverse ruling on the motion in limine and the party adjusts their trial strategy by introducing the evidence to limit its ill effects on the jury.

The dissent states:

I believe Wright was entitled to play the hand the court dealt her and that she is not procedurally barred from asserting these issues on appeal.

I agree with the dissent.

First, Quin is not “on point.” Quin did not deal with a situation where a party did not object at trial to the admissibility of evidence where the court had ruled it admissible in ruling on a motion in limine. Quin dealt with the opposite. In Quin, the State violated a motion in limine ruling at trial and the court found that the defendant waived the issue by not objecting at trial:

The State did in fact violate the motion in limine regarding the amount of money Quinn had on her person by specifically questioning Brister about the matter. However, the record is devoid of any objection by Quinn when such question was asked of Brister. Therefore we find that an issue that is not properly brought to the attention of the trial court by appropriate timely objection is waived. Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824, 832 (Miss. 1995). The supreme court has repeatedly held that "if no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived." Id.

There was no violation of a motion in limine in Wright. Instead, plaintiff adjusted her trial strategy to account for the court’s prior ruling.

Second, the dissent’s position has superior support in the case law than does the majority’s position. The majority cites one case that arguably does not apply at all. The dissent cites several Mississippi Supreme Court cases that support the dissent’s view.

Third, the majority ignores “reality on the ground” in the courtroom. it has been my experience that trial judges get annoyed fast when lawyers repeatedly object on the same issue. Trial judges seem to consider the issue to be preserved for appeal once an objection has been made and an adverse ruling issued. A motion in limine that has been ruled on should count as lodging an objection and in my experience, it has. I have seen plenty of times when a lawyer stands up and asks: “judge, I lost on my motion in limine, I don’t have to keep objecting do I?” Invariably the answer is “no—your objection is noted in the record” and usually the opposing attorney is shaking his/her head in agreement. Lawyers should not have to keep objecting repeatedly for fear of waiving the objection. It slows trials down and annoys both the judge and jury.

Finally, a valid reason for filing a motion in limine is to determine what evidence will be in play at trial. The party that loses should be entitled to adjust their trial strategy to account for the ruling. A party being the first to mention damning evidence is a trial strategy that is routinely taught in trial practice courses and practiced in the courtroom. According to the Court of Appeals, you cannot do it in Mississippi because if you do, you have waived your objection to the evidence.

That doesn’t seem fair. I agree with the dissent’s analogy that at that point, you are simply playing the hand that you are dealt. 

I would like to hear what other trial attorneys think about this decision.       

NMC Refutes Clarion-Ledger Statement About DeLaughter's Reversal Rate

The Saturday Clarion-Ledger was legal themed with three articles covering legal issues. There was this article about Big Law paying would-be associates to perform public interest work instead of starting work at the firm, which doesn't have work for new associates due to the recession. These are great programs for several reasons. Money starved non-profits and public policy firms get free legal work. The new lawyers get valuable experience and exposure to the poor and and mistreated that most would not otherwise obtain. The bad news is that this is a terrible sign for the legal industry in general and current law students in particular. For the legal industry it indicates how little work big firms have. For law students, if Big Law is paying new lawyers to work somewhere else, then the job market must be terrible.   

Another article was this article about this week's Mississippi Court of Appeals decision in which the Court ruled that a railroad did not have standing to challenge an adoption by a former employee who sued the company.

The longest article was this Jerry Mitchell article about the Mississippi Supreme Court reversing Judge DeLaughter's grant of summary judgment for attorneys Gene Tullos and Crymes Pittman. The article contained this statement:

Since that plea, the high court has upheld nearly all of DeLaughter's rulings in criminal and civil cases.

That did not seem right when I read the article. It did not seem right to Tom Freeland either, who wrote this post about it at NMC and commented:

Since the first of August, the Mississippi Supreme Court has published opinions in four cases appealed from rulings by Judge DeLaughter.  All four were reversed; it’s a small sample size, but the court hasn’t upheld a single one of DeLaughter’s rulings since the plea.   His rulings have faired better in the Court of Appeals– three affirmances, two in civil cases (one of the affirmances was a pro se criminal appeal).  Going back to when the cloud first formed over his head in December of 2007, there were two reversals and six affirmances by the Supreme Court, which is more what you’d expect.

I’m having trouble counting four reversals, no affirmances as “upholding nearly all of DeLaughter’s rulings…” since the plea.

Agreed. I try to read the Court's hand-down decisions every Thursday. My general impression, without going back and doing the research, was that Judge DeLaughter was usually affirmed before the judicial bribery scandal and has been usually reversed since the scandal. Perhaps that is just a coincidence. But perhaps it is not. Overnight, DeLaughter went from a very respected judge to a judge whose every ruling is suspect. It's only natural for the Court to take a harder look at DeLaughter's decisions.

As for the underlying Tullos case, it should be kept in mind that the Court's reversal was on procedural grounds and did not address the merits of the case. Both Tullos and Pittman commented for the Clarion-Ledger article and appear to have solid defenses. I think it was smart for Tullos and Pittman to comment to Mitchell to get their side of the story out to the public. I do not understand why more people who are parties in high profile cases do not get their story into to public domain.

Court of Appeals issues thirty-two opinions in one day

The Court of Appeals issued a record (?) thirty-two opinions today leading into the July hiatus. I have not read all thirty-two and hope Tom Freeland or Ipse Blogit beats me to it.

In Borne v. Dunlop Tire Corp.  a unanimous Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment due to the fact that Plaintiff's affidavit supporting the opposition to the motion was based on hearsay and not personal knowledge. This was a products liability case involving a Ford Explorer roll-over where the Plaintiff did not have the Explorer or the other three tires on the vehicle. Judge Samac Richardson granted summary judgment because the Plaintiff could not prove that the tire that the Plaintiff did have came off the subject vehicle. The Plaintiff's attempt to satisfy this burden consisted of an affidavit from an attorney that was not based on personal knowledge.

The decision could be categorized as a mercy killing. A footnote states that the Plaintiff was able to settle with Ford Motor Co., although I can't imagine it having been for a large amount without the vehicle. Most plaintiff lawyers understand the importance of having the product at issue in a products case. Unfortunately, the actual plaintiffs sometimes let the product get away before hiring a lawyer who will secure the vehicle or other product.

Court of Appeals affirms jury verdict for Goodyear one week after affirming seperate verdict against Goodyear

Last week the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed a $2.1 million verdict against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in a defective tire case in Copiah County. The Associated Press later botched its analysis of the Court's decision.

This week a unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed a 2005 Washington County jury verdict in favor of Goodyear in Oliver v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. Judge Lee wrote the Court's opinion. Goodyear's defense counsel was a team of lawyers from Watkins & Eager that included David Ayers and Jimmy Wilkins.

The facts of the two cases were similar in some respects. In both cases the vehicle was speeding when a tire burst, leading to an accident where the un-belted driver was thrown from the vehicle and died. But that is where the similarities end. In the Copiah County case, the tire was new and had been properly maintained and serviced, including a few days before the accident. In the Washington County case, there was "considerable testimony at trial" that the decedent failed to properly maintain the tire. These differences apparently made a big difference in the trial court verdicts.

In the Washington County case the jury disagreed on whether the tire was defective, but unanimously agreed that a defective tire was not the proximate cause of the accident. The Court of Appeals can make a compelling argument that it is fair to everyone when it affirms a verdict against Goodyear one week and affirms a verdict for Goodyear the next week. Notice that as in the decision last week, the Court did not agree or disagree with the jury. Instead, the Court evaluated whether there was reversible error and determined that there was not. It will be interesting to see if this decision gets any press, since defense verdicts and appellate decisions affirming defense verdicts typically receive less press that plaintiff's verdicts.  

 

Associated Press misstates Court of Appeals' Ruling in Defective Tire Case

The Clarion-Ledger website contains the A.P. story on the $2.1 million verdict against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. that I discussed in an earlier post. While the AP correctly stated the facts of the case, it misstated the ruling of the Mississippi Court of Appeals.

The statement that I have trouble with is the following:

The young men’s families — and a jury — blamed the accident on a faulty tire on the Chevrolet Camaro rather than excessive speed and the beer the men had been drinking.

The Mississippi Court of Appeals agreed this week and upheld a $2.1 million verdict against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. and Big 10 Tire Co.


The Court of Appeals neither agreed nor disagreed with the jury's verdict. Instead, the Court considered the issues raised on appeal by Goodyear and found that there was no reversible error. The Court was required by law to give deference to the jury's decision and could only reverse if there was no evidence to support the prevailing party and reasonable jurors could not have ruled in the prevailing parties' favor. Since the jury found for the plaintiffs, the Court was required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.  Applying this standard, the Court found that the jury's decision was supported by sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict.

The Court could not and did not simply read the trial transcript and decide whether the Court thought that the jury got it right. Appellate judges do not substitute their assessment of the evidence for the jury's assessment. The Court's fifty-six page opinion cited substantial evidence that supported the jury's verdict. If the Court had found reversible error, it likely would have been related to jury instructions or other procedural rulings by the trial court. This would have resulted in a new trial, not a judgment in favor of Goodyear. It would be nice to see the news media recognize this important distinction.

 

Court of Appeals affirms $2.1 million defective tire verdict

On Tuesday the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed a $2.1 million Copiah County Circuit Court jury verdict in favor of three plaintiffs against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. Judge Forrest Johnson presided over the trial because Judge Lamar Pickard recused himself from the case. Judge King wrote the majority opinion, which was fifty-six pages long. Judges Griffis and Barnes dissented without an opinion and Judge Carlton wrote an opinion concurring in result only. It looks like plaintiff's lead counsel at trial was Mike Allred and Goodyear's was Michael Baxter of Copeland Cook.

The case involved a car crash that killed one young man and injured two others. The driver was intoxicated and the car was traveling at between 88-92 mph when a back rear tire failed and the car crashed. It was undisputed that there was a tire failure. Plaintiff argued that there was a breach of warranty because the tire should have been safe up to 112 mph, but fell apart because of the car's speed. Goodyear argued that the tire hit an object that caused the failure and that the driver could have averted the crash if he had been sober.

The Court rejected all eight of Goodyear's appeal issues, which covered the water front. One interesting point was that the trial judge granted more than one form of the verdict instruction. One was a general verdict form and another was for apportionment of fault to the driver. The jury returned its verdict in general form with no allocation of fault. It makes sense to have more than one form of the verdict form for that situation, but I have always thought in terms of there having to be only one form of the verdict instruction and cannot recall having a trial with more than one.

Another interesting issue involved a jury instruction that Goodyear objected to, but the Court found that the objection was not specific enough and was therefore waived.

It will not be surprising to see the Supreme Court take this case given the size of the verdict and numerous issues. If so, Justice Kitchens will not participate, since he was one of the plaintiffs' attorneys.

 

Court of Appeals affirms $350,000 jury verdict

On Tuesday the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed a $350,000 jury verdict in APAC v. Johnson. The verdict was from the Circuit Court of Washington County. The facts were that an APAC truck hit a power line, causing a pole to fall on plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiff had to be removed from the vehicle with the jaws of life and suffered C6 and C7 fractures. The plaintiff's medicals were $12,621.34. APAC admitted liability.

APAC's numerous appellate issues included whether the trial court should have allowed treating physicians to testify as fact witnesses and whether the verdict was excessive. A unanimous court of appeals affirmed the verdict.

Regarding the amount of the verdict, the Court stated that the jury has "broad leeway" when it comes to a damages award. The Court did not find bias, passion or prejudice due to the evidence that the plaintiff had a fractured vertebrae, ongoing pain and limitation of her former activities.